jectives and examines why the range and reach of macroeconomic policies is different in the two sets of countries. Section 4 shows that the relative importance of trade-offs in macroeconomics depends on the institutional context, and analyses why the process of macroeconomic adjustment in developing countries, conditioned by their structural characteristics, might turn out to be verydifferent from that in industrialized countries. Section 5 argues that the distinction between short-run macroeconomic models and long-term growth ) models is not quite appropriate in the context of developing countries where macroeconomic constraints on growth straddle time hori~ zons. Section 6 concludes.
Institutional setting
It is widely recognized that developing economies are significantly different from industrialized economies. Yet, the macroeconomic models used, in terms of analytical constructs, typically follow a similar classification: classical, Keynesian and monetarist. The consensus among economists, much like fashion, has changed over time. The Keynesian consensus vanished, largely because the focus shifted from unemployment to iriflation, I but the shift was attributable, in small part, to the difficulties in reconciling the Keynesian worldview with behavioural hypotheses about households and firms in standard microeconomic analysis. The increasing focus on inflation and growth also shifted focus from aggregate demand to aggregate supply. This led to the emergence of supply-side economics, which argued for reducing public investment inthe hope of stimulating private investment through incentives such as tax-cuts. Thereafter, for some time, the monetarist ttadition became the ruling orthodoxy in macroeconomics. It stressed the importance of monetary aggregates and justified a natural rate of unemployment. But in most quarters there is now a consensus that monetarism too failed.
Neo-classical and neo-Keynesian models each had their day in the suno The former constructed macroeconomic theories based on I It is plausible to argue, but difficult to establish, that this shift in focus from unemployment to inflation mirrored a change in the balance between contesting political ideologies.
standard neo-classical assumptions of methodological individualismo Hence, neo-classical analysis emphasized the role of rational expectations, using representative agent models. As a result, it ignored the fundamental Keynesian distinction between households as savers and firms as investors. Neo-classical theorizing was premised on the idea that markets always cleared. Thereby it assumed away the problem of unemployment. What is more, it ignored the theory and evidence on market imperfections, asymmetric information and economic irrationalities. Neo-Keynesian analysis attempted to redefine microeconomics so as to make it consistent with macroeconomic observations. These models sought to focus on wage-price rigidities, but such theoretical explanations for rigidities were little better than the ad hoc models that they were intended to replace.
The implicit theorizing in all of these models has obvious shortcomings in explaining fluctuations in the level of economie activity in industrialized countries. But these are even less satisfactory as macroeconomics in the context of developing countries, where agriculture creates a dualism, where the financial sector is underdeveloped, where the informaI sector is large, where markets are not perfect, where prices are often flexible and where unemployment, often disguised as underemployment, is widespread.
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The macroeconomic aggregates are, of course, the same. So are the macroeconomic identities. For an understanding of macroeconomic systems, however, the accounting relations of aggregates need to be combined with an economic analysis of causaI determinants, to describe the behaviour of households, firms and governments. It is here that differences arise. The nature of relationships (between variables) and the direction of causation (what determines what) are both a function of the setting or the context.
The starting point for any macroeconomic analysis is the distinction between exogenous and endogenous variables or that be-, tween autonomous and induced changes. 5uch a distinction is essen-. tial in macroeconomic theorizing which seeks to analyse policy implications. It is important to recognize that this distinction is derived not from the analytical structure but from the institutional setting of models.
The most important example, perhaps, is the Keynesian idea that investment is an independent (exogenous) variable to which saving adjusts as a dependent (endogenous) variable. Investment is autonomous, deterrnined by profit expectations of firrns, while saving is induced, determined by income of households. The distinction rests on the institutional assumption that firrns have access to credit from commerciaI banks and financial institutions depending on their credit worthiness and the expected profitability of their projects, irrespective of the level of savings by households in the economy. Thus, it is the institutional setting of what Hicks characterized as an 'overdraft economy' which allows investment to be financed in advance of, and independent of, the level of saving in the economy.3 A short digression is worthwhile. If credit is endogenously determined by demand, then the Keynesian perspective emerges in its sharpest focus. The independence of the investment function of firms deterrnines effective demand (hence output), while the financial system merely plays an accommodating role without influencing the level of demand (hence output). On the other hand, if credit is assumed to be exogenously determined by the financial system, the monetarist perspective, or at least a perspective that seeks to focus more on fin ance, emerges as criticaI, in so far as banks have a role in influencing the investment decisions of firrns by relaxing or tightening credit facilities extended to firms. 4 Or, if firrns have to rely mostly on their own capitaI to finance investment in a financial market without depth, then corporate profits, or savings, largely determine investment. 5 In either case, investment can no longer be treated as exogenous.
The moral of the story is clear. The distinction between exogenous and endogenous variables, or that between the autonomous and 3 See Hicks (1937) .
• Monetary authorities can influence the willingness and ability of banks to provide credit. If there is credit rationing, it is not just interest rates but also the availability of credit that determine investment. And even if investment is determined by the interest rate, the interest rate is effectively determined by the monetary authorities either directly, or indirectly through money supply. For a discussion, see Greenwald and Stiglitz (2003) .
, The monetarist perspective is an attempt to incorporate finance, since it is credit th at drives economie activity more than money. But money and credit are highly correlated. The control of centrai banks over money supply can be thought of as a surrogate for their control over credit supply. Monetarism failed in part because, at criticai times, money supply and credit supply do not move in tandem.
induced changes, is essentiai in macroeconomie models, which seek to anaIyse events or prescribe policies. However this distinction does not derive from the analytical structure of a modei but from the un derlying instituti~nai setting of the mode!. Much can change, especially in terms of policy prescriptions, when institutionai settings, hence determinants of causation, cl.ange. And without some notion of causation, or the sequence of events in time, no policy prescription is possible. Therefore, even equilibrium reiations require some causaI interpretation, at Ieast for policy analysis.
It follows that macroeconomics developed in the context of industrialized countries cannot simply be transplanted in developed countries. Starting from accounting identities, models can be built based on economie reasoning, but such modeis must respect institutionai facts and recognize different contexts.
Structural differences
Ihere are important differences in the structurai characteristics of developing economies as compared with industrialized economies. In the world of macroeconomics, there are at least six that deserve to be highlighted. It is, of course, essenti al to remember that there are important differences among developing countries not only across regions but also within regio ns.
First, from a Keynesian perspective, in advanced capitalist economies, the main problem is the adequacy of effective demando Such an economy possesses a productive capacity whieh matches the existing Iabour force but capitaI equipment remains under-utilized for Iack of demando It is not as if there are no suppIy constraints. There are. And recent advances in macroeconomics have emphasized . how shocks to the economy can lead to shifts in the aggregate supply curve as well as the aggregate demand curve.
6 But the expansion of >output is primarily demand-constrained. The crucial problem of de-", veloping countries is different. Even if its productive capacity or cap-, ital equipment is fully utilized, it cannot absorb the existing Iabour . ' force in gainfui empIoyment. The probIem then is the deficiency of , See, for example, Greenwald and Stiglitz (2003) . productive capacity and not the anomaly of its underutilization. 7 It is not as if there are no demand constraints. Ihere are. In some sectors of an economy, output may be demand-constrained for some time.
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In some economies output may be demand-constrained for some time. And recent stabilization experiences suggest that a contraction in demand can, and does, induce a contraction in output. But the expansion of output is primarily suppIy-constrained. Ihis structural difference is embedded in differences in stylized facts about the two sets of economies: limited Iabour and unlimited capitaI in industrialized countries, as compared with limited capitaI and unlimited Iabour in developing countries. Ihis reality has, to some extent, changed over time. And the increasing openness of economies is aiso influencing this reality.
Second, there may be differences in the degree of price flexibility. In both industrialized economies and developing countries, these may vary across sectors and change over time. In the institutionai context of industrialized countries, macroeconomics sought to focus on the implications of wage-rigidities. But in developing countries, where formaI sector empIoyment is a small proportion of empIoyment in the economy as a whole, the rigidity of money wages, or real wages, is a Iess criticaI policy probIem. 9 In fact, the nature of price formation differs across sectors in these dualistic economies. In the agricultural sector, prices are determined largeIy by demand and suppIy through market-clearing. Indeed, government support prices for agriculture in many developing countries are attributable to this reality. In the non-agriculturai sector, particuIarly manufacturing, prices are determined through mark-ups on a cost-pius basis.
10 Moreover, in some developing countries wages in the organized sector are characterized by an indexation which imparts rigidity to reai wages. , See Kalecki (1976a and also 1971). 8 Cf. Nayyar (1994) . See also Bhaduri (1986) . , lt needs to be said that this generalization is not quite bome out by the Latin Arneriean experienee, where the widespread adoption of contraet indexation created strong real wage rigidi ti es. IO This charaeterization of price forrnation in developing countries was the essential assurnption in Kalecki"s writings on rnaeroeconornics with reference to underdeveloped countries (see Kaleeki 1976b) . This assurnption played a strategie role in the Iiterature on strueturalist eeonornies that ernerged in the 1970s and 1980s, rnostIy in the Latin Arneriean context but also in the lndian context (see, for example, Taylor 1983 and Rakshit 1989 ).
In such price-wage interaction, the role of trade unions is often significant but not quite recognized. Obviously, generalizations are difficult. Yet, it can be said that agricultural prices are more flexible than industriaI prices, and agriculture is typically more important in developing countries. Historically, oligopolies, with their associated price-rigidities, were more important in industrialized countries than they are now, but such oligopolies remain important in the manufacturing sector in many developing countries. On balance, it is plausible to argue that wages and prices are more flexible in developing countries than in industrialized economies. II It is also reasonable to suggest that, insofar as there are wage-rigidities in both sets of countries, the underlying factors are different. 12 Third, in the medium term, sources of output growth are different. In the industrialized economies, output growth is driven by pro--ductivity increase which, in turn, is a function of the level of investment and the pace of technical progresso In developing economies output growth is, or at least should be, driven by labour absorption through employment creation in the non-agricultural sector and, in some part, through a shifting of labour from low productivity employment to higher productivity employment in the manufacturing sector or the services sector. In this process, investment plays a criticaI role. Of course, in most successful developing countries, which eliminate disguised unemployment in the agricultural sector, approximate to full employment in the industriaI sector, or dose the technological gap between themselves and industrialized countries, productivity increase becomes the primary source of output growth.
11 Some studies suggest that there is more volatility in wages in developing countries, perhaps because trade unions and employment protection are relatively weak. This suggests that there may be more flexibility of wages, but it could also be partly because developing countries are more vulnerable to shocks (see Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz 200I) .
" The explanations for wage rigidities may also differ. In very poor countries, the subsistence wage may consti tute a floor. A1ternatively, the nutritional efficiency wage may be part of the explanation: employers do not want to pay a lower wage, because at a lower wage productivity is significantly lower because nutrition is insufficient. (The relationship between productivity and wages is the subject of a vast literature. See, for example, Stiglitz 1976.) In other countries, minimum wages may play an important role. In yet other countries, efficiency wage theories based on selection, incentive or morale effects may provide a more important part of the explanation for real wage rigidity. In this context, it is worth noting that the stylized facts from Latin America conform more closely to industrialized economies than to developing countries. And, in the long run, growth in output per capita requires productivity gains regardless of labour market conditions. This is borne out by the experience of massive productivity growth in Japan, Korea and, now, China.
Fourth, there are pronounced differences in financial markets. In the industrialized countries, financial markets, institutions and instruments are far more developed than in the developing countries. And there are significant differences in the degree of monetization. Consequently, in developing countries, firms rely more on self-financing than their counterparts in industrialized economies, in part because equity markets are underdeveloped as a source of finance for new investments. IJ Borrowing from informaI money markets is common; And debt-equity ratios are, as a rule, higher. In industrialized countries, increasingly, there has been a move away from bank lending towards securitization. These differences are, in important part, attributable to the absence or presence of institutions, as also to the depth of financial markets.
14 However, even the form and availability of financial instruments can make a difference. 15 An important function of financial markets is to transfer and absorb risk. Underdeveloped financial markets in developing countries mean that they are less able to absorb shocks than industrialized economies. 16 Fifth, governments in industrialized countries have little trouble in financing their deficits, whereas governments in developing countries typically face greater financial constraints. In fact, experience suggests that few developing countries can sustain a government deficit that is 5% of GDP, or more, for long. Of course, borrowing from Il India is, perhaps, an exception to this rule, in so far as equity markets are a . significant and increasingly important source of finance for firms. For a discussion on stock markets as a source of corporate financing in developing countries, see Singh (1997) .
14 Rural credit markets provide a striking example of such specificities in developing countries. Moneylenders in the agricultural sector, who have access to the market for credit, transfer the risk entirely to the poor borrower through an undervaluation of collateral assets (see Bhaduri 1977) . " In the United States, where most mortgages are fixed rate and do not have significant prepayment penalties, the lowering of interest rates leads to refinancing. In the United Kingdom, however, a more common form of mortgage is the variable rate mortgage with fixed payments, so that lowering interest rates would presumably have a much weaker effect.
" Of course, even sophisticated capitai markets are capable of generating huge messes, such an Enron and LTCM in the United States, or bad debt in Japan, but the much greater depth of financial markets makes it possible to contain such crises. the centraI bank is an option. But it cannot be stretched beyond limits for that could be dangerous. Indeed, such excessive deficit financing was an important source of hyperinflation in several Latin American economies. ConsequentIy, most govemments in developing countries run pro-cyclical fiscal policies. 17 The financial constraints facing govemments exacerbate problems that arise in the private sector. In such a context, underdeveloped financial markets, or inadequately developed financial sectors, impede the ability of developing countries to absorb shocks.
Sixth, in comparison with industrialized countries developing countries are much smaller but more open economies. Of course, in this dimension, generalizations are difficult because thereare marked differences between countries in the developing world as also between countries in the industrialized world. Yet, it is plausible to suggest that most developing countries are more open, insofar as exports constitute a larger proportion of GDP and foreign capitaI inflows fin ance a larger proportion of domestic investment. The combination of greater openness and smaller size means that economies of developing countries are not only more prone but also more vulnerable to external shocks. The analysis of macroeconomic fluctuations in the case of a small open economy illustrates many of the deficiencies of orthodox economics. For if the standard assumptions were true, an adjustment of the exchange rate would result in an infinite demand for a country's exports. In such a world, any problem . of insufficiency of aggregate demand would be easy to solve, so that it would be logical to focus on aggregate supply. But it is simply not appropriate to borrow the small country assumption from orthodox trade theory for macroeconomic analysis in the context of developing countries. Developing countries have always been vulnerable to terms of tra de changes associated with openness in trade. The openness to capitaI flows has accentuated this vulnerability. And, in a world of capitaI market liberalization, developing countries are far more exposed to, but much less ab le to cope with, exogenous shocks and financial crises.
Objectives and policies
The differences are not only structural. Macroeconomic objectives in developing countries are, or should be, different from those in industrialized countries. In the industrialized economies, the traditional policy objectives were internaI balance and extemal balance. 18 InternaI baI ance was defined as full employment combined with priee stability. Extemal balance was defined as equilibrium in the balance of payments, primarily with reference to the current account and, more precisely, in terms of the distinction between autonomous and accommodating transactions. 19 The conception of internaI balance, now, is confined to price stability. And full employment is no longer an integraI part of the objective. Presumably, this is partly attributable to the belief that if the government achieves priee stability, then the market will automatieally achieve the objective of full employment. But there is little reason to believe that this is in fact the case, in industrialized or developing countries.
In a world of capitaI account liberalization, the meaning of external balance is less than clear. It extends much beyond the current account as most capitaI account transactions are autonomous rather than accommodating.
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In the developing economies, the traditional conct;m was economie growth in the long term. The emphasis was on savings and in-" The distinction between internai balance and external balance was first ma de by Meade (1951) . These were the policy objectives of the mode!. There were two sets of policy instruments: income adjustments (through fiscal and monetary policies) and price adjustments (through exchange rate variations or wage flexibility).
" The distinction between autonomous and accommodating transactions in the balance of payments was also first ma de by Meade (1951) . Autonomous transactions are undertaken for their own sake, for the profit or the satis,faction they yield. They do not depend on other transactions. Accommodating transactions, by contrast, are not undertaken for their own sake. They depend on other (autonomous) transactions. Hence, they are a residual that accommodates gaps. External balance is, then, defined as a situation where receipts and payments on account of autonomous transactions are equal so that accommodating transactions are zero. 20 At the time that Meade made the distinction, as also for a long period thereafter, the current account, in which ali transactions were autonomous, was the major component of the balance of payments. Thus, autonomous transactions in the capitai account were modest, while accommodating transactions were shaped mostly by the .. current account ba!ance. The significance of the capita! account in the balance of payments has increased enormously with capita! mobility. So has the importance of autonomous transactions in the capitai account.
vestment. Ihe focus shifted to macra-management in the short tenn, after many developing countries, particularly the so-called emerging economies in Latin America as also the transition economies in Eastern Europe, ran into debt crises or otner forms of macroeconomic disequilibrium if not turbulence. Again, the reason often put forward was that, if the govemment succeeded in achieving price stability in the short run, alI else, including growth, would foIlow. Even so, the essential objective in developing countries is to step up the rate of growth as much as possible. Faster growth will lead to higher incomes and more employment. Clearly, the growth has to be sustainable. Ihere is a presumption that it will not be sustainable if inflation soars or if the balance of payments gets too far out of line. Ihus, it is sometimes postulated that the objective of macroeconomic policy should be to maximize growth subject to two constraints: that inflatian remains within limit of tolerance and the current account deficit in the balance of payment remains within manageable proportions. And, often, it is very difficult to anticipate which of these problems will arise or which of the constraints will become binding. Maximizing growth typically means maximizing current output and employment, if labour productivity growth is constant or exogenous.
Macroeconomic policies are the same. Ihe traditional policy instruments, in both industrialized economies and developing eco no-· mies, are fiscal policy and monetary policy. But the range and the reach of these policies differ in the two sets of countries. Any consideration of fiscal policy should make a distinction between revenue and expenditure of the govemment. In developing . countries, tax revenues are based less on direct taxes and more on ' . indirect taxes as compared with industrialized economies. Moreover, in developing countries, almost without exception, the base for taxa-:.tion is significantly narrower while tax compliance is significantly ;' . .lower (which is attributable to tax avoidance and tax evasion). Ihus, · governments find it very difficult to increase their income through · tax revenuesY Ihis is a problem because, as a rule, tax-GDP ratios in developing countries are much lower. In industrialized economies, where tax-GDP ratios are much higher, the debate is about tax-cuts.
In the sphere of expenditure, developing countries are characterized f \ "Indeed, govemments fìnd it exceedingly ditlìcult to tax certain sectors, groups . ?r;classes. For this reason, the tax-GDP ratio in countries such as India and Mexico IS much too low, even when compared with some developing countries. by proportionately larger govemment sectors where degrees of freedom are circumscribed by political compulsions, possibly more than in industrialized economies. What is more, in developing countries, the proportion of investment expenditure in total public expenditure is higher thim in industrialized economies because private investment in infrastructure is not always forthcoming. Yet, in difficult times, it is such investment expenditure that is axed because govemments find it very difficult to cut consumption expenditure. This means that excessive fiscal stringency imposes a high cost in terms of lost growth. In industrialized economies, the proportion of public expenditure on social security and social sectors is significantly higher than in developing countries, even if the need for such expenditure is as strong in the latter. Because so many more individuals are near subsistence, even small cuts in these social expenditures can have large consequences. In industrialized countries, a cut in educational expenditures willlead to slightly larger c1ass sizes and, arguably, a reduction in the quality of education. In developing countries, a cut in educational expenditures will mean that more children will not go to school. On the whole, it is clear that govemments in industrialized economies have much more fiscal flexibility than their counterparts in developing countries.
Monetary policy c1early highlights the differences, which are much more pronounced, particularly in terms of reach, because money markets are often segmented, if not under-developed, in developing countries. Insofar as the effects of monetary policy are more narrowly directed, the economic costs of reliance on monetary policy may be greater and its effectiveness lower. Open market operations are obviously a limited option in thin markets. In the past, many developing countries sought to use interest rates as a strategie instrument for guiding the allocation of scarce investible resources in a market economy.22 In such a context, it is not surprising that, in developing countries, the volume of credit was always perceived as more effective than the price of credit as an instrument of monetary 22 The striking examples of sueh a strategie use of interest rates are the East Asian eountries, partieularly Japan and Korea (see Wade 1990 and Chang 1994) . In this eontext, it is worth noting that the deregulation of domestie financial markets in deve10ping eountries is bound to limit the use of the strueture of interest rates, say a differentiation between short-term rates and long-term rates, as a means of influeneing the alloeation of searee resources. '\ policy. The practice has changed in the recent past since the deregulation of domestic financial sectors has led to the emergence of markets for financial assets. This should have ma de interest rates a more potent instrument. Ironically enough, it has not, because capitaI account convertibility has curbed flexibility in the use of interest rates. Industrialized economies are not immune from the fetters of international financial markets, but the reach of monetary policy is significantly greater than in developing countries.
It is aiso important to recognize the somewhat different macroeconomi c implications of the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy in developing countries. For example, the monetary impact of fiscai policy is perhaps greater in developing countries because a much larger proportion of the fiscai deficit is financed by borrowing from the centraI bank. In a shallow capitaI market, the alternatives are few and far between. And, in developing countries, borrowing from the centraI bank is the principai source of reserve money which makes it the most important determinant of monetary expansion. This is no Ionger the case in most Latin American economies, but remains the reality in most other developing countries. Similarly, the fiscal impact of monetary policy is perhaps greater in developing countries, because, in situations where public debt is large as a proportion of GDP and interest payments on these debts are large as a proportion of gcivernment expenditure, even modest changes in interest rates exercise a strong influence on fiscai flexibility.
The orthodox belief system that higher interest rates would help reduce macroeconomic imbalances is not always borne out by the reality of experience with the use of monetary policy in developing countriesY Higher interest rates do not necessarily reduce government borrowing in situations where it is difficult to increase income or reduce expenditure of the government. But higher interest rates almost certainly make public debt less manageableY Conceivably, higher interest rates also feed into inflation through cost-pl,lsh mechanisms.
In a changed international context, it is also important to recognize that countries which are integrated into the world financial " See Nayyar (2001) . ,. The most obvious examples of this syndrome are Argentina , Brazil and Turkey. system are constrained in using an autonomous management of demand to maintain levels of output and employment. Expansionary fiscal and monetary policies -large govemment deficits to stimulate aggregate demand or low interest rates to encourage domestic investment -can no longer be used, as easily as in the past, because of an overwhelming fear that such measures could lead to speculative capitaI flight and , a run on the national currency. 25 The problem exists everywhere. But it is far more acute in developing countries.
Trade-offs and adjustment
There are important trade-offs in macroeconomics, particularly in the sphere of macroeconomic policies, which must be recognized. However, the significance of such trade-offs depends on the context. The trade-off between inflation and unemployment is much more important in the industrialized economies than it is in the developing countries. The trade-off between short-term macro-management and long-term objectives is much more important in the developing countries than it is in the industrialized countries.
The conventional trade-off between inflation and unemployment is epitomized in the Phillips curve. But this construct is much too limited. 26 In the near-obsessive concem of govemments with the control of inflation, driven more and more by intemational financial markets, it is often forgotten that the management of inflation is not an end in itself. And, beyond a point, reducing inflation is at the cost of not only employment but also growth. Of course, even in industrialized economies, the focus is on deflation now that the macroeconomic context has changed. In fact, debt-deflation has been a major issue in economies where asset price bubbles have burst or crashed. In developing countries, there is no well de fin ed Phillips curve. Indeed, it is difficult to conceptualise a negative relationship between the rate of inflation and the rate of unemployment in economi es where non-participation in the labour force, disguised unemployment in the subsistence agricultural sector, underemployment in the " Far a more detailed discussion on this issue. see Nayyar (2003) , ", Far a discussion. see Jung (1985) . See also Bagchi (1994) , urban informai sector, wage employment in the formai (manufacturing and services) sector co-exist in a spectrum without dear lines of demarcation.
In developing countries, as also transition economies, in recent years, public policies have come to be pre-occupied with macromanagement in the short term and re-structuring of economies in the medium term. The former is driven by quest for stabilization. The latter is prompted bythe quest for efficiency. This is in conformity with the orthodoxy embodied in the Washington Consensus. There is, however, an important trade-off between short-term concerns and long-term objectives. For one, there are some long-term conse<l.uences of short-termism. Macroeconomic policies implemented with a short-term objective may have adverse consequences for the performance of the economy in the long term, through hysteresis, if the effects of short-term policies persist over ti me to influence outcomes in the long term.
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It is possible to cite several examples which show that the preoccupation with short-term management and medium-term restructuring may have damaging consequences in the long term. 28 Trade liberalization, which leads to the exit of domestic firms on a significant scale, ultimately affects the capacity of an economy to respond to changes in relative prices. The reason is simple. Exit is easy but reentry is difficult. Similarly, financialliberalization, which leads to a persistent, if not mounting, overvaluation of the exchange rate, may Force domestic firms to dose down.
29 By the time the overvaluation is undone, hysteresis effects could be strong. This means that re-entry becomes difficult, for domestic firms must create new capacities to 21 It might seem that the concept of trade-off, which refers to choices at a point in time, is diluted by the notion of hysteresis, which refers to effects that persist even long after the cause is removed. But it is not, because the trade-off between shortterm concerns and long-term objectives is discemible only across time horizons.
" For an analysis ofthis issue, see Nayyar (1998) . " Such an overvaluation, with similar consequences, may be attributable to monetary contraction or fiscal expansion, as it was in the United States during the first half of the 1980s. And there was a literature that examined the hysteresis effects of the persistent overvaluation of thc US dollar. Thc upshot of this literature was that overvaluation leads tI> an accumu lation of adverse trade effects which ul timately need to be remedied through an overdepreciation. The reason is that, in the presence of hysteresis, a period of sustained undervaluation is. needed to bring forth the required investment. For a discussion, see Dornbusch (1987) . This parable conveys an important lesson about the significance of the long-term real exchange rate. r l capture the opportunities created by the changed set of relative prices. But that is not ali. The workers who are unemployed as a consequence of closures may lose their skills with the passage of time and become less productive when employment opportunities appear after a lag. lt is also possible that their old skills, even if retained, are less relevant after a time.
Furthermore, a preoccupation with the short term often leads to a systematic neglect of long-term development objectives. There are two reasons for this. First, in the sphere of economics, such objectives cannot be defined in terms of oversimplified performance criteria set forth by the Bretton Woods institutions. Second, in the realm of politics, such objectives do not bring tangible gains which can be exploited by governments or administrations within their term of office. In a longer time horizon, the development of human resources and the acquisition of technological capabilities are examples of such objectives, the neglect ofwhieh could turn out to be most problematie.
JO Conventional macroeconomies simply does not recognize this trade-off. Orthodoxy believes that an adjustment of the mix of instruments, say, tighter fiscal policy coordinated with looser monetary policy, can be used to achieve whatever growth objective the government wants at the same time that the desired employment objective is achieved.
The process of adjustment in economies at a ma ero level differs not only over time but also across space. Single models cannot suffice. And generalizations are perilous. Ali the same, it should come as no surprise that, as in most of economie theory, a mechanism of adjustment or a process of change must work either through prices or through quantities or through some combination of both. Yet, the mode and speed of adjustment at a ma ero level in developing countries are different from those in industrialized economies.
Considerable evidence suggests that there is much greater economie volatility in developing countries than in industrialized countries. This is partly because the economies are smaller, less diversified, and exposed to greater shocks, whieh they are less equipped to absorb. Their adjustment processes work less well and more slowly. Markets that function well have the capacity to absorb shocks and dissipate them through the economy. In developing countries, as a ,. See Nayyar (1998). rule, markets work less well. Hence, it should come as no surprise that such economies respond less well to shocks. The exact nature of the failure, however, is subject to some contention and may well differ across countries. In some cases, there may be greater price rigidities. In such situations, economies adjust at a macro level through changes in output rather than changes in prices. Moreover, the greater the rigidity in prices, the greater is the burden that is placed on quantity (income or output) adjustments.
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On the other han d, there is also some evidence that prices and wages are more volatile in developing countries, consistent with the hypothesis that they are more, not less, flexible. It is the imperfections ·of capitaI markets which shape differences in how shocks are absorbed, or amplified, in the economy. Equity markets are better at risk-sharing than debt markets, and developing countries rely more heavily on debt.
32 Countries with very high debt-equity ratios (as was the case for many East Asian countries before the 1997 financial crises) become highly vulnerable to certain kinds of shocks, and the process of adjustment, which entails recapitalizing financial institutions, is much more complicated.
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There is another significant difference between industrialized economies and developing economies which lies in the speed of adjustment. In generai, the speed of adjustment in developing countries, particularly on the supply side, is slower than it is in industrialized countries. The reason is simple. Resources are not perfectly mobile across sectors or substitutable in uses, and prices, particularly of factors, are not completely flexible. These problems are accentuated in developing economies which are characterized by structural rigidities. The dynamics of demand are fast in expansion and in contraction. In contrast, the dynamics of supply are slow in expansion (which is partly attributable to the limitations in financial markets) even if somewhat faster in contraction. " See Stiglitz (1999) .
II Theories based on the economics of information (asymmetries in information) explain not only the limitations of equity markets but also why they play a much smaller role in developing countries as compared with industrialized economies.
" Of course, the soda I arrangements for saving, not to mention finandal chuming, also matter and differ across countries. In China and Russia, for example, where private saving is high, capitai flight is a possible outcome. The high private saving in Japan, in contrast, leads to more direct foreign investment.
Constraints on growth
In the context of industrialized countries, there is a distinction between macroeconomic models, where the focus is on the short run, and growth models, where the time horizon is the long term. The interconnections are important. But these are not explored enough in such analysis. The dichotomy extends to theorizing about developing countries. This is obviously not appropriate, particularly because structural constraints, characteristic of these economies, have several different dimensions. Some of the dimensions of these constraints can be depicted in short-run macroeconomic models. Others must be built into long-term growth models. But there are some that can only be analysed through models that link short-run macroeconomic adjustments with long-term patterns of growth. Such models are few.
In the context of developing countries, there is a literature around the theme of macroeconomicconstraints on growth. J4 But this literature remains in the domain of development economics. It is not an integraI part of macroeconomics for development. Yet, arguably, it should be. This literature suggests that, at a macro level, economie growth in developing countries may be limited by a savings constraint, a foreign exchange constraint, a wage goods constraint or a fiscal constraint. Such models start from the premise that, given a capital-output ratio, the rate of investment determines the rate of growth in an economy. The focus, then, is on what constitutes, at the margin, the effective constraint on increasing investmento A saving constraint represents a situation where investment cannot be raised because consumption is at a minimum acceptable level. A foreign exchange constraint represents a situation where available savings cannot be transformed into investment because the requisite investment goods cannot be imported. A wage goods constraint represents a situation where the rate of growth of supply of necessities does not allow the level of investment to be raised any further. 35 A fiscal constraint represents a situation where limits on public investment mean that total investment cannot be increased J4 There is an extensive literature on two-gap models. The earliest contributions were McKinnon (1964) and Chenery and Strout (1966) .
" In analyzing macroeconomic constraints on growth in underdeveloped countries, Kalecki sought to focus on the wage goods constraint (see Kalecki 1970) . beyond a level because there is a complementarity between public investment and private investment. Of couIse, these models are simple analytical abstractions. The essential message is that the cost of alleviating the binding macroeconomie constraint on growth, at the margin, is high in developing countries.
There is a literature on 'gap models' that debates whieh of these constraints might be dominant and explores the macroeconomie implications or consequences of the interaction between these constraints. 36 Of course, in equilibrium, these constraints are always satisfied. Indeed, the constraints only exist ex ante, but cannot be there ex post because there can be no gaps in accounting identities. Embedded in the discussion of 'gap models' are certain assumptions about whieh variables are exogenous and whieh are endogenous, or whieh elements of economie behaviour can be altered by economic policy and which cannot. Such analytical constructs may not be important in themselves. But the moral of the story is important. They draw our attention to the variety of ways by whieh policy can affect macroeconomie equilibrium and the variety of interactions that need to be taken into account. Most important, perhaps, these models focus on the possible trade-offs that have to be faced in formulating macroeconomie policies.
Given such macroeconomie constraints, irrespective of which particular constraint is dominant, any attempt to step up the rate of growth in an economy spills over into an acceleration in the rate of inflation or a difficult balance of payments situation. The threshold of tolerance for inflation, determined by polity and society, may vary from as little as 5% per annum to as much as 100% per annum. The manageability of a difficult balance of payments situation depends on the willingness and ability of creditors in the outside world to lend, or to finance current account deficits; this willingness and ability varies significantly from country to country and that depends on the historical context. But that is not alI. The essential point is that an understanding of macroeconomie constraints on growth, in the context of developing countries, is important because it highlights macroeconomic interactions between the short run and the long term.
)G See Bacha (1990) and Taylor (1994) . 
Condusion
The essential point to emerge from this essay is that the nature of relationships and the direction of causation in macroeconomies, which shape analysis, diagnosis and prescription, depend upon the institutional setting. This essay also demonstrates that there are systematic differences between industrialized economies and developing countries, just as there are significant differences among developing countries. And even if some laws of economies are universal, the functioning of economies can be markedly different. Therefore, good economie theory and good policy analysis should recognize, rather than ignore, such myriad differences.
